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ABSTRACT
The proposed revisions to the diagnosis of personality disorders in ICD-11 move the diagnosis of personality dis-
orders from the categorical to the dimensional. Although there may be a number of good reasons to consider
changes in the manner in which we diagnose personality disorders, the method proposed here goes too far in the
degree of changes that it proposes. It ignores the fact that at least for some of the personality disorders, there is data
that supports them as distinct diagnostic entities separate from other axis I and axis II disorders. Eliminating the
diagnostic categories that have been part of the established psychiatric nomenclature for the last 30 years threatens
to undermine the significant research and clinical advances that have been made using categorical diagnoses.
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
It appears that much thought and care went into
the recent position paper by Tyrer et al., ‘The ratio-
nale for the reclassification of personality disorder in
the 11th revision of the International Classification
of Diseases (ICD-11)’, which appears in this issue of
Personality and Mental Health. The paper is clearly
written and makes a straightforward and cogent
argument as to why we need a revision of the
manner in which we go about (process) as well as
the criteria that we use in arriving at a diagnosis
within the personality disorder realm. The case
presented here is somewhat different from that
made by the DSM-5 personality and personality dis-
orders workgroup (APA, 2011; Gunderson, 2010;
Skodol, 2011), although I suspect that there was
more internal dissension in the DSM-5 group de-
spite the fact that the paper here from the World
Health Organization had authors from 10 different
countries. The manuscript suggests that there were
at least four areas that needed to be addressed in
the process of reform of the current classification
of personality disorders: ‘(a) The unsatisfactory
current labels of personality disorder based on
categories; (b) The wide variations in levels of
personality disturbance and associated impairment
that the current system includes; (c) The artificial
dichotomy of a personality disorder diagnosis from
no personality disorder and (d) the stigma attached
to the diagnosis leading to its infrequent use’. This
paper will attempt to touch on most of those issues,
although most of the attention here will be paid to
the issue of dimensional diagnosis.
Diagnosis involves both the process and the
end result of knowing or perceiving (gnosis) how
to separate things apart (dia) from one another.
In current usage, we often think of diagnosis as
the end result of that process (i.e. we arrive at a di-
agnosis), but in truth, diagnosis involves both the
process by which we try to identify a disease by
way of its signs and symptoms as well as the name
or label finally given to the detailed description
that discriminates the entity from others (W. B.
Saunders Company, 1965). Kendell and Jablensky
(2003) wrote that ‘If the defining characteristic of the
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category is a syndrome, this syndrome must be dem-
onstrated to be an entity, separated from neighboring
syndromes and normality by a zone of rarity [italics
added here]. Alternatively, if the category’s defining
characteristics are more fundamental – that is, if
the category is defined by a physiological, ana-
tomical, histological, chromosomal, or molecular
abnormality – clear, qualitative differences must exist
between these defining characteristics and those of
other conditions with a similar syndrome’ (p. 7).
The previous statement by Kendell and Jablensky
would, in my opinion, suggest that in developing a
diagnostic category, one should search for points of
rarity that distinguishes it from other categories or
that there should be clear qualitative differences
present to help separate it from other conditions
with similar clinical and/or laboratory presenta-
tions. Although the second sentence of the quote
from Kendell and Jablensky may be in concert with
the idea of dimensionality, it would seem that the
first sentence with its emphasis on a zone of rarity
would lobby against a dimensional approach to
diagnosis. In a dimensional system, there is no zone
of rarity. In a categorical system, there is a clear
distinction between what is and what is not, and
that would involve in some way having a zone of
rarity that defines what is in the diagnostic category
and what is not. A dimensional system does not
achieve this but rather suggests that each increment
or degree of severity or recruitment of an additional
criterion pushes the process of arriving at a diagnosis
a tiny bit closer to pathology or a little further away
from the range of normality, whatever that might
be. The broad classification of personality disorders
based upon severity as proposed here would not
meet that standard of true qualitative difference
because each progressive classification along the
personality–personality disorder continuum appears
to be continuous with the class above as well as the
class below with no clear criteria set or rating scale
to determine when personality difficulty becomes
personality disorder or when personality disorder
becomes complex personality disorder and so on,
save for the increased number of situations in which
difficulties have arisen. Although Tyrer et al.
suggest that categorical diagnoses should be elimi-
nated because of criterion overlap, the scheme pre-
sented here contains much overlap without any
zones of rarity. We are left here in the same boat
that all clinicians attempting to make a psychiatric
diagnosis are left in; that is, that psychopathology
is very dependent upon the subjectivity of the clin-
ical evaluator.
However, the five severity levels of personality
disturbance as proposed may fit better with the
second sentence of Kendell and Jablensky’s state-
ment in that there is a good attempt here to
develop ‘qualitative differences . . .. between [one
condition’s] defining characteristics and those of
other conditions with a similar syndrome’. I agree
with Tyrer et al. that the first step in the diagnosis
of personality disorder needs to be deciding
whether the individual we are assessing does or
does not meet criteria for a personality disorder
or at least whether there is a strong enough suspi-
cion of the possible presence of a personality disor-
der that further time should be spent in evaluating
the more specific nature of that personality distur-
bance. Both the ICD recommendations as de-
scribed in the paper as well as the proposed
DSM-5 (where the first question asked is ‘Is im-
pairment in personality functioning. . . present or
not? (American Psychiatric Association, 2011))
involve a process of first determining whether
there is the possibility of a personality disorder be-
ing present before proceeding further. Without
this first step becoming a routine step, there will
not be any progress made on clinicians failing to
or simply ignoring the possible presence of a per-
sonality disorder. If this question related to the
possible presence of a personality disorder is not
raised initially, it will rarely be considered later al-
though I am not sure that any change will get most
harried primary care physicians to ask this ques-
tion, at least in the United States.
But after establishing at least that there might be
a personality disorder present and that one should
attend to that issue, the system, in my opinion, fails
because it stops providing relevant information; it
suggests that all that we have learned about specific
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personality disorders in the past can be sacrificed to
the concept of dimensionality. The argument is
made that dimensional measures are used in other
branches of medicines, and the example of blood
pressure is often put forward. There are many more
examples of this dimensional approach such as in
diabetes, cardiac risk and anaemia. But within those
dimensions, (1) there are clear cut-offs as to what
defines pathology and (2) there are many disease
entities that are clearly categorical such as meta-
static disease, myocardial infarction and cerebral
vascular accident (stroke) to name a few. Although
one might have many risk factors say for a stroke,
and those risk factors can be measured, for example,
in how much of the lumen of a carotid or middle
cerebral artery remains patent (determined by
magnetic resonance imaging, CT scan or Doppler),
the stroke does not occur until there are clinical
symptoms present of a stroke. Once the stroke is
determined, there may be severity measures that
can help us evaluate how bad the stroke was, but
nonetheless, it is a stroke and is clear and distinct
from let us say, transient ischemic attacks, which
could be viewed as a dimension of a potential
stroke or a liability to have a stroke. But nonethe-
less, the category of stroke is not achieved until
the signs and symptoms of the event and its
sequelae are present (pregnancy is a state, if not
a true diagnosis, where the diagnosis or condition
is clearly categorical).
There are substantial differences in both training
and approach to diagnosing mental disorders between
psychology and psychiatry. Academic psychology has,
as best as I can tell, most frequency applied a dimen-
sional approach to issues of psychopathology and diag-
nosis of mental disorders. Psychology focuses on deter-
mining the continuum from normal (or non-
pathological) to pathological. Medicine on the other
hand, for good or for bad, deals with the pathological.
Although it is true that medicine, at least in the
United States, has been criticized for not doing
enough with respect to prevention, in other words
fromworking to help reduce the progression from nor-
mal or somewhat abnormal to true pathology or dis-
ease, nonetheless, medicine has studied and dealt with
defining what is pathological and how one pathologi-
cal state differs from another, perhaps in concert with
Kendell and Jablensky’s first sentence mentioned pre-
viously. Certainly there is neither a right nor a wrong
to this dimensional/categorical argument. Rather it is
amatter of approach, embedded in one’s specific disci-
pline, and as physicians, we deal with pathology and
in distinguishing one pathological state from another
and do not usually deal with how far a given patient
is from normal. Once pathological, as determined
most often through a categorical diagnosis, the situa-
tion demands treatment to make it less pathological.
We would hope a return to normal as the ultimate
outcome, but as we know from recent research, we
are much better at getting people to remission
(hopefully a sustained remission). But we much
more rarely get them to full, sustained recovery
(Gunderson et al., 2011; Trivedi & Daly, 2008;
Zanarini, Frankenburg, Reich, & Fitzmaurice,
2010).
There are many aspects of the argument raised
by Tyrer et al. that are valuable for further discus-
sion, but space and the fact that others are also
commenting on the paper lead me to restrain
these comments. But a few merit some brief men-
tion. The argument is made that the current cate-
gorical diagnoses lead to lost data. For example, a
patient with four of nine criteria for borderline
personality disorder is closer to ‘pathology’ (5/9
in DSM-IV-TR) than ‘normalcy’ and thus in a
categorical system determining that there is no
disease (i.e. no diagnosis on axis II because full cri-
teria have not been met) on axis II fails to convey
what is present. For this reason alone, it is sug-
gested that we need dimensions. But one could
just as easily establish the ‘probable’ condition of
borderline personality dimension and then in pa-
rentheses write the number of criteria present.
Not only would this allow a specific diagnostic
category to be formulated, but also the number
of criteria present would be a specific numerical
measure of severity (Oldham & Skodol, 2000).
Further, arguments have been made that there
needs to be some way that we address the problem
of stigma. I am surprised that the authors do not
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address the issue directly, that is, by saying that
there is a substantial need to educate the public
about what we have learned about the course
and treatability of at least some personality disor-
ders. When I was young, people never used the
word cancer; it was a diagnosis that needed to be
whispered rather than spoken out loud. And yet
we now have cancer centres where people with
cancer who know they have cancer go for treat-
ment for their cancer, and this despite the fact
that overall we still are not very good at effectively
treating the cancer so that we may cure the patient
(Kolata, 2009). If anything, the improvements
come through early detection and more specific
categorization through various types of genetic
and other laboratory measures. But the stigma
about cancer was overcome by educating people as
to what it was and facing it head on rather than
avoiding it or changing its name or developing a di-
mensional model (such as normal cells, somewhat
atypical cells, greater atypical cells and cancer cells)
because the prognosis was bad or because it meant
for most people death. It is such education that we
ought to put forth at least for borderline personality
disorder, the category that we have the most empi-
rical research data for, data not only about course
and treatment but also about distinguishing it from
other personality and affective disorders (Gunderson
et al., 2011, Lequesne & Hersh, 2004; Prossin, Love,
Zubieta, & Silk, 2010; Zanarini and Frankenburg,
2008; Zanarini et al., 1989).
Psychiatry is unique in that it attempts to un-
derstand psychiatric disorder not only in the cur-
rent context and in the current social environment
but also in its effort to understand and appreciate
the illness and the person with the illness in terms
of the person’s individual history, early life experi-
ences, genetic and environmental experiences and
the opportunities, both genetic and environmen-
tal, to develop resilience. If we do not consider
patients in their entire historical context, we fail
to evaluate and appreciate fully how individuals
get to where they are at the current moment, with
the current symptoms and with the current psycho-
logical tools to deal with themselves, with others,
with society and with their symptoms or disease
(Tyrer, Sensky, &Mitchard, 2003). In considering
the process of the diagnosis of personality disorders,
there is a history that needs attending to, an under-
standing of how the broader category of personality
disorders has been understood over time. Newer
dimensional schemes ignore that history since, by
radically changing the approach to diagnosis, they
interrupt the continuity with the past and suggest
that if the old data fit we will take it and that if it
does not fit we can simply dismiss it because there
is no place in our current diagnostic system for it.
Decades of thinking about and researching prodro-
mal events, genetic predispositions, biological ab-
normalities, parental attitudes and others will be
lost because the research is tied to specific diagnos-
tic categories and not to prototypes or dimensions.
Although I am sure that the proponents of a
dimensional model of personality disorder do
not mean to allow this to happen, it does raise
the question of whether we are willing to risk
25–35 years of knowledge and research to put
in place a model that represents a narrow point
of view that has not in general been accepted
by psychiatry or medicine rather than a system
that builds on what we already know and
attempts to move the field of psychiatric diag-
nosis forward in an incremental fashion.
References
American Psychiatric Association. (2011). Proposed revision.
Personality disorders. http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevi-
sion/Ppages/Personality Disorders.aspx. Accessed 7 August
2011.
Gunderson, J. G. (2010). Revising the borderline diagnosis
for DSM-V: An alternative proposal. Journal of Personality
Disorders, 24, 694–708.
Gunderson, J. G., Stout, R. L., McGlashan, T. H. Shea,
M. T., Morey, L. C., Grilo, C. M., Zanarini, M. C.,
Yen, S., Markowitz, J. C., Sanislow, C., Ansell, E., Pinto,
A., & Skodol, A. E. (2011). Ten-year course of borderline
personality disorder. Psychopathology and function from
the Collaborative Longitudinal Personality Disorders
Study. Archives of General Psychiatry, 68, 827–837.
Kendell, R. E., & Jablensky, A. (2003). Distinguishing be-
tween the validity and utility of psychiatric diagnoses.
The American Journal of Psychiatry, 160, 4–12.
299The risks may be too high
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 5: 296–300 (2011)
DOI: 10.1002/pmh
Kolata, G. (2009). Advances elusive in the drive to cure cancer.
The New York Times, 24 April, A1.
Lequesne, E. R., & Hersh, R. G. (2004). Disclosure of a diagno-
sis of borderline personality disorder. Journal of Psychiatric
Practice, 10, 170–176.
Oldham, J. M., & Skodol, A. E. (2000). Charting the future
of axis II. Journal of Personality Disorders, 14, 17–29.
Prossin, A. R., Love, T. M., Koeppe, R. A., Zubieta, J. K., &
Silk, K. R. (2010). Dysregulation of regional endogenous
opioid function in borderline personality disorder. The
American Journal of Psychiatry, 167, 923–933.
Skodol, A. E. (2011). Scientific issues in the revision of personality
disorders for DSM-5. Personality and Mental Health, 5, 97–111.
Trivedi, M. H., & Daly, E. (2008). Treatment strategies to
improve and sustain remission in major depressive disor-
der. Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 10, 377–384.
Tyrer, P., Sensky, T., & Mitchard, S. (2003). Principles of
nidotherapy in the treatment of persistent mental and
personality disorders. Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics,
72, 350–356.
W. B. Saunders Company. (1965). Dorland’s illustrated medical
dictionary (24th ed.). Philadelphia:W. B. Saunders Company.
Zanarini, M. C., & Frankenburg, F. R. (2008). A preliminary,
randomized trial of psychoeducation for women with bor-
derline personality disorder. Journal of Personality Disor-
ders, 22, 284–290.
Zanarini, M. C., Frankenburg, F. R., Reich, D. B., & Fitzmaurice, G.
(2010). Time to attainment of recovery from borderline
personality disorder and stability of recovery: A 10-year prospec-
tive follow-up study. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 167,
663–667.
Zanarini, M. C., Gunderson, J. G., Frankenburg, F. R., &
Chauncey, D. L. (1989). The revised diagnostic inter-
view for borderlines: Discriminating BPD from other
Axis II disorders. Journal of Personality Disorders, 3,
10–18.
Address correspondence to: Kenneth R. Silk, MD,
Professor of Psychiatry, University of Michigan
Health System, Rachel Upjohn Building, PO
Box 579, 4250 Plymouth Rd, Ann Arbor, MI
48109–2700, USA. Email: ksilk@umich.edu
300 Silk
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 5: 296–300 (2011)
DOI: 10.1002/pmh
